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VCG AUCTION MECHANISM COST EXPECTATIONS
AND VARIANCES
SVANTE JANSON AND GREGORY B. SORKIN
Abstract. We consider Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auctions
for a very general combinatorial structure, in an average-case set-
ting where item costs are independent, identically distributed uni-
form random variables. We prove that the expected VCG cost is at
least double the expected nominal cost, and exactly double when
the desired structure is a basis of a bridgeless matroid. In the ma-
troid case we further show that, conditioned upon the VCG cost,
the expectation of the nominal cost is exactly half the VCG cost,
and we show several results on variances and covariances among
the nominal cost, the VCG cost, and related quantities. As an
application, we find the asymptotic variance of the VCG cost of
the minimum spanning tree in a complete graph with random edge
costs.
1. Introduction and outline
We begin with a motivating example. We want to buy a specific
structure in a graph, such as a spanning tree. Each edge has a sep-
arate owner, who has a minimum “true” cost for which he would sell
the edge; this cost is private, known only to the owner. One obvious
“mechanism” for choosing a spanning tree to buy is to ask each owner
for the price of his edge (for example by a simple sealed-bid auction),
and then choose the minimum (cheapest) spanning tree (MST) and pay
the owners of the chosen edges the prices that they have demanded.
The problem with this and many other mechanisms is that the owners
have an incentive to lie about their true costs: an owner that claims
a higher price will get more money, unless the price becomes so high
that another spanning tree is chosen.
The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction [Vic61,Cla71,Gro73] is
designed to avoid this problem. By using a clever mechanism defined
in Section 2 below, which typically will pay the owners of the chosen
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edges more than their claimed costs, an owner maximizes his profit by
claiming his true cost of his edge (assuming that the owners act without
collusion). Thus the selected structure will really be the cheapest one,
and therefore the most efficient from society’s point of view (in terms
of using the least resources), although the price we pay for it is higher
than the true cost. The main purpose of the present paper is to study
this overpayment.
Examples are known for which the VCG mechanism results in arbi-
trarily large overpayment; see for example [AT07]. A typical situation
may be better represented by an average-case setting. Previous work
has shown that with independent, identically distributed uniform item
costs, the expectation of the VCG auction price cVCG is exactly 2 times
that of the nominal cost c∗ in a procurement auction for a minimum
spanning tree, and larger by a factor asymptotically approaching 2 in
auctions for a perfect matching in a complete bipartite graph, and a
path in a complete graph [CFMS09].
A unifying explanation for these results was given by [AHW09], see
Section 4. Using their argument, we show in Theorem 3.1 that for
any VCG auction with independent, uniformly distributed item costs,
E(cVCG) ≥ 2E(c∗), and in Theorem 3.3 that in a matroid setting (in-
cluding the minimum spanning tree example) E(cVCG) = 2E(c∗). In
the matroid case, we also show further results. In particular, a ma-
troidal development of the same ideas leads to Theorem 3.5, the much
stronger result that E
(
c∗ | cVCG) = 1
2
cVCG for the conditional expecta-
tion. This implies that Cov(c∗, cVCG) = 1
2
Var(cVCG), and Theorem 3.7
gives a variety of other variance relations.
Outline. Section 2 introduces VCG auctions, related notation, and the
basic properties that we will draw on. Section 3 states the theorems just
described, along with some related results. Proofs are given in Sections
4–7. Here we use the ideas of [AHW09] and our extension of them; we
also use a very different type of matroidal argument, combined with a
martingale method, to give a second proof of Theorem 3.3 and to prove
parts of the variance results of Theorem 3.7.
In Section 8 we give some results for non-uniform cost distributions.
Theorems 8.1 and 8.2 extend Theorems 3.1 and 3.5 to any distributions
with decreasing density functions. In many probabilistic problems, ex-
ponential distributions yield simpler results than uniform distributions,
but this is not the case here: Corollary 8.3 and Theorem 8.5 give par-
ticular results for the exponential distribution (which in this setting
does not lead to equalities) and to a Beta distribution B(α, 1) (which
does).
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We give some examples illustrating our theorems in Section 9. In
particular, Example 9.1 gives asymptotic results on the expectation and
variance of the VCG cost of a MST in Kn with i.i.d. U(0, 1) edge costs:
the expectation is ∼ 2ζ(3) as shown by [CFMS09], and the variance
is ∼ (24ζ(4)− 18ζ(3))/n. The other examples are much simpler, and
serve partly as counterexamples showing some ways in which our results
cannot be improved.
2. VCG mechanism, payment, and threshold
In order to define the VCG mechanism, we introduce some terminol-
ogy. We consider, as in the example above, the case of a single buyer
and multiple independent sellers of different items. (The buyer may
also act as the auctioneer, or there may be a separate auctioneer, but
in any case the two roles are equivalent for our purposes, and we will
speak of the buyer.)
A procurement or reverse auction instance I = (A,S, c) consists of a
set A of items, a collection S of desired structures, S ⊆ 2A, and a cost
function c : A→ R≥0 giving the cost c(a) of each item a. The buyer’s
goal is to obtain any structure S ∈ S, paying as little as possible. For
any S ∈ S, the (nominal) cost of structure S is
c(S) :=
∑
a∈S
c(a) =
∑
a∈A
c(a)1[a ∈ S] . (2.1)
We use the phrase nominal cost to distinguish it from the VCG cost
defined below. Let c∗ be the minimum cost,
c∗ = c∗(I) := min
S∈S
c(S), (2.2)
and call any S ∈ S achieving this minimum a minimum structure.
(Explicitly showing c∗ as a function of the instance I will sometimes
be important, for example in (2.3).)
The VCG mechanism purchases a minimum structure S∗, just as
a simple auction would. (If there are several minimum structures, it
chooses one arbitrarily. In the random setting that we will consider in
our main results, the minimum structure is unique with probability 1,
so there is no issue, but we will be precise about this throughout.)
We say that the items a ∈ S∗ are selected. No payment is made for
any item not selected. For each selected item, the owner is paid an
amount at least as large as the nominal cost, and typically larger. This
payment, the VCG cost, is defined as follows.
Given any instance I, for each item a ∈ A define an instance I0a to
be identical to I except that c(a) = 0. Likewise, let I∞a be identical to
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I except that c(a) =∞. Define the incentive payment for item a as
c+(a) := c∗(I∞a )− c∗(I) ≥ 0, (2.3)
and the VCG threshold for item a as
cVCG(a; I) := c∗(I∞a )− c∗(I0a). (2.4)
(The names will soon be justified by (2.5) and (2.9)–(2.10).) The pay-
ment for item a under the VCG mechanism is given by:
VCG payment to a :=
{
0 if a /∈ S∗
cVCG(a; I) = c(a)+c+(a) if a ∈ S∗, (2.5)
with the implicit equality justified by (2.6). Note that by (2.4), the
VCG threshold for a, and thus the VCG payment if a is selected, de-
pends only on the costs of other items, not on c(a).
Let S∗ be a minimum structure. If a ∈ S∗ then c∗(I) − c∗(I0a) =
c(a), because if a is already part of the minimum structure S∗, then
decreasing its cost to 0 means S∗ is still a minimum structure, and the
cost of S∗ decreases by c(a). Then, by (2.4) and (2.3),
cVCG(a; I) = c∗(I∞a )− c∗(I0a)
= [c∗(I)− c∗(I0a)] + [c∗(I∞a )− c∗(I)]
= c(a) + c+(a) (2.6)
≥ c(a). (2.7)
If a /∈ S∗, then c∗(I∞a ) = c∗(I) so c+(a) = 0; moreover, c∗(I) ≤ c∗(I0a)+
c(a), and hence
cVCG(a; I) = c∗(I∞a )− c∗(I0a) = c∗(I)− c∗(I0a) ≤ c(a). (2.8)
Recapitulating, if S∗ is a minimum structure,
a ∈ S∗ =⇒ c+(a) ≥ 0 and cVCG(a; I) = c(a) + c+(a) ≥ c(a), (2.9)
a /∈ S∗ =⇒ c+(a) = 0 and cVCG(a; I) ≤ c(a). (2.10)
If S∗ is a unique minimum structure, we can say a bit more. In this
case, if a ∈ S∗, then c∗(I∞a ) > c∗(I) so c+(a) > 0 and there is strict
inequality in (2.7). And if a /∈ S∗, then c∗(I0a) + c(a) > c(S∗) = c∗(I),
and thus there is strict inequality in (2.8). That is, if S∗ is unique then
we cannot have equality in (2.9) nor in (2.10), so that
a ∈ S∗ ⇐⇒ c+(a) > 0 ⇐⇒ cVCG(a; I) ≥ c(a)
⇐⇒ cVCG(a; I) > c(a). (2.11)
If follows that any minimum structure S∗ contains every item a with
c(a) < cVCG(a; I), and no item with c(a) > cVCG(a; I); this justifies
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calling cVCG(a; I) the VCG threshold. Furthermore, S∗ is unique if
and only if there are no items with c(a) = cVCG(a; I). (It is easily
seen that if there is any such item then there is at least one minimum
S∗ containing a and another without a. Recall that in our continuous
random setting, minimum structures will be unique with probability 1.)
As said above, the VCG payment for a selected item a depends only
on the costs of other items, not on c(a). This leads to the truthfulness
property of the VCG mechanism stated earlier: it is always optimal for
the owner of item a to set its declared price, c(a), equal to the item’s
true value to him, call it cpriv(a). If cpriv(a) < cVCG(a; I) then the owner
will be happy to receive payment of cVCG(a; I) and therefore should
declare some price c(a) < cVCG(a; I). If on the other hand cpriv(a) >
cVCG(a; I), then the owner would rather not sell, and therefore should
declare some price c(a) > cVCG(a; I). In either case, setting c(a) =
cpriv(a) will work. Since the owner does not know cVCG(a; I), declaring a
cost c(a) 6= cpriv(a) merely risks the loss of a profitable sale (if cpriv(a) <
cVCG(a; I) < c(a)) or a disadvantageous sale (if cpriv(a) > cVCG(a; I) >
c(a)).
Let us now look at the total amount paid by the VCG mechanism,
which is the sum over all selected items, items a ∈ S∗, of the payment
for a given by (2.5). Let us start with the incentive payments c+(a).
We use the common notation that x+ := x if x > 0, and 0 otherwise.
Define the VCG overpayment for any minimum structure S∗ by
c+(S∗) :=
∑
a∈S∗
c+(a)
=
∑
a∈A
c+(a) =
∑
a∈A
(
cVCG(a; I)− c(a))
+
=: c+(I). (2.12)
The second inequality relies on (2.10), and the third on (2.10) and (2.9).
The final quantity c+(I) is well-defined because the middle expressions
do not depend on S∗. That is, the VCG overpayment is a function of
the instance: it is the same for any minimum structure S∗. Similarly,
define the total VCG cost by
cVCG(S∗) :=
∑
a∈S∗
cVCG(a; I) =
∑
a∈S∗
(
c(a) + c+(a)
)
= c∗ + c+(S∗) = c∗ + c+(I) =: cVCG(I); (2.13)
again, cVCG(I) is well-defined because neither c+(S∗) nor c∗ depends
on S∗.
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3. Main results
Our main results concern the expectations of the costs c∗ and cVCG
when the item costs are independent random values. In particular, we
are interested in the case when the costs are uniformly distributed on
some intervals [0, da]; in this case we have the following general result.
Theorem 3.1. In the general VCG setting, if the costs c(a) are inde-
pendent uniform random variables, c(a) ∼ U(0, da), then
E(cVCG) ≥ 2E(c∗). (3.1)
That is, the expected VCG cost is at least twice as large as the nom-
inal cost of the minimum structure: the VCG mechanism is overpaying
significantly. While this is the natural way of thinking of the conclusion,
at a technical level our proofs, and results such as Theorem 3.5 below,
suggest that it is perhaps better thought of as E(c∗) ≤ 1
2
E(cVCG).
We obtain further results in a matroid setting where S is the family
of bases of a matroidM on ground set A. We recall that there are many
equivalent definitions of matroids and many examples of different types;
see e.g. [Wel76,Whi86]. One important example of the matroid case is
the motivating spanning-tree example at the beginning of the paper,
which translates to matroid language as follows. (All the ideas in the
paper can be appreciated by thinking of just this example, but working
with matroids gives greater generality, and highlights the restricted set
of properties needed.)
Example 3.2. G is a connected graph. M , the graph matroid (or
cycle matroid) of G, has ground set A = E(G), the edges of G, and its
bases are the spanning trees of G. A minimum-cost structure is then
a minimum-cost basis, namely a minimum-cost spanning tree (MST).
Let M be a matroid with ground set A. For any subset S ⊆ A, let
r(S) denote the rank of S. An element a ∈ S is called a bridge in S if
r(S \a) < r(S). (When M is a graph matroid, this definition conforms
with that of a bridge in a graph.) Let
β(S) := | {a ∈ S : r(S \ a) < r(S)} | (3.2)
be the number of bridges in S. The bridges ofM are those of its ground
set A, and M is bridgeless if there is no such element. (We will use the
terms “element” and “item” interchangeably, favoring element in the
matroid context, and item in the auction context.)
For bridgeless matroids using a common uniform distribution of the
item costs, we have exact equality in Theorem 3.1. (We have to exclude
bridges, since a bridge belongs to every minimum structure and thus
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its VCG payment is ∞, so the total VCG cost is infinite for a matroid
with bridges, c.f. (3.5) below.)
Theorem 3.3. For a bridgeless matroid with costs c(a) i.i.d. uniform
random variables, c(a) ∼ U(0, 1),
E(cVCG) = 2E(c∗).
Theorem 3.3’s special case of a MST in a complete graph was proved
by [CFMS09]. That paper also showed that the expected VCG cost is
asymptotically (but not exactly) equal to twice the nominal cost for a
minimum-cost path between a pair of vertices in a complete graph, and
for a minimum-cost assignment in a complete bipartite graph. These
are special cases of Theorem 3.1 but not of Theorem 3.3, and the
asymptotic equality is discussed further in Remark 4.2.
Proofs of the theorems above are given in Section 4. Section 5 gives
a second proof of Theorem 3.3 using the following formulas of indepen-
dent interest for the nominal and VCG costs in the matroid case. For
t ≥ 0 let
A(t) := {a ∈ A : c(a) ≤ t} (3.3)
be the set of items of cost at most t. (Recall that costs are by definition
non-negative.)
Lemma 3.4. Let M be a matroid with arbitrary (random or non-
random) costs c(a). Then
c∗(M) =
∫ ∞
0
(
r(A)− r(A(t))) dt (3.4)
cVCG(M) = c∗(M) +
∫ ∞
0
β(A(t)) dt. (3.5)
Theorem 3.3 concerns the overall expectations of cVCG and c∗. In
Section 6 we use a matroidal extension of the ideas in the first proof
of Theorem 3.3 to show the following result on the conditional expec-
tation of c∗ given cVCG; note that it is a considerable strengthening of
Theorem 3.3 (which follows by taking the expectation).
Theorem 3.5. For a bridgeless matroid with costs c(a) i.i.d. uniform
random variables, c(a) ∼ U(0, 1),
E
(
c∗ | cVCG) = 1
2
cVCG. (3.6)
As an immediate corollary, we obtain the following formula for some
mixed moments of c∗ and cVCG.
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Corollary 3.6. For a bridgeless matroid with costs c(a) i.i.d. uniform
random variables, c(a) ∼ U(0, 1), and any real m ≥ 0,
E
(
c∗(cVCG)m
)
= 1
2
E
(
(cVCG)m+1
)
. (3.7)
Proof. Multiply (3.6) by (cVCG)m and take the expectation. 
These results do not generalize to higher powers of c∗. Example 9.3
shows that, given cVCG, the conditional distribution of c∗ is not deter-
mined, although by Theorem 3.5 its conditional expectation is. The
same example shows that E((c∗)2) and E((cVCG)2) are not in fixed pro-
portion, i.e., Theorem 3.3 does not generalize to the second moment;
see also Theorem 7.1. Similarly, while the power of cVCG in Corol-
lary 3.6 is arbitrary, it can be seen from the example that there is
no similar formula involving the second or higher power of c∗. Nev-
ertheless, there are some general relations between the variances and
covariances of c∗ and cVCG, and we prove the following in Section 7.
The proof will use Theorem 7.1 (itself proved with the first of our two
methods for proving Theorem 3.3) and Lemma 7.3 (proved with the
second method).
Theorem 3.7. For a bridgeless matroid with costs c(a) i.i.d. uniform
random variables, c(a) ∼ U(0, 1),
Cov(c∗, cVCG) =
1
2
Var(cVCG). (3.8)
Var(cVCG) = 4Var(c∗)− Var(cVCG − 2c∗), (3.9)
Var(c∗) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Cov
(
r(A(s)), r(A(t))
)
ds dt, (3.10)
Var
(
cVCG − 2c∗) = ∫ 1
0
(
r(A)− Er(A(t))) 2t dt (3.11)
=
∫ 1
0
E(β(A(t))) t dt. (3.12)
The proof of Theorem 3.5 uses the following very general results of
independent interest; the proofs are given in Section 6. We extend
the notations I0a and I
∞
a from Section 2. Given an instance I and two
disjoint sets of items F and E, let I0,∞F,E be the instance I modified so
that all items in F have cost 0 and all items in E have cost ∞; if E
or F is empty we write just I0F and I
∞
E , respectively. In analogy with
(2.4), for any independent set F and any a ∈ F , define an extended
VCG threshold by
cXvcg(F, a) := c∗(I0,∞F\{a},a)− c∗(I0F ). (3.13)
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Thus cVCG(a) = cXvcg({a} , a), and cXvcg(F, a) extends several key prop-
erties of the simple VCG threshold. One is immediate from the def-
inition: for a ∈ F , cXvcg(F, a) has value independent of the costs on
F , just as cVCG(a) is independent of the cost of a. Other extended
properties follow from the lemma below.
Lemma 3.8. Consider a bridgeless matroid with ground set A and
arbitrary costs c(a), and let S∗ be a minimum basis. Then
F ⊆ S∗ =⇒ (∀a ∈ F ) : cVCG(a) = cXvcg(F, a). (3.14)
Furthermore,
F ⊆ S∗ =⇒ (∀a ∈ F ) : c(a) ≤ cXvcg(F, a), (3.15)
F ⊆ S∗ ⇐= (∀a ∈ F ) : c(a) < cXvcg(F, a), (3.16)
and if all 2|A| sums of costs over different sets of elements are distinct,
F ⊆ S∗ ⇐⇒ (∀a ∈ F ) : c(a) ≤ cXvcg(F, a). (3.17)
By (3.14), if a ∈ F ⊆ S∗, the extended VCG threshold is equal to
the simple one. The key properties of the simple VCG threshold are
(2.9)–(2.11); (3.15)–(3.17) give analogous properties for the extended
VCG threshold.
Lemma 3.8 shows that for F ⊆ S∗, the VCG payments cVCG(a) for
the items in F depend only on the costs of the items not in F . (For
this conclusion, we get the strongest result if we choose F = S∗.) This
is a substantial (and non-obvious) extension of the observation after
(2.5) that the payment cVCG(a) does not depend on c(a).
A possibly interesting implication is that collusion among a set F of
owners will not affect their payments, as long as F ⊆ S∗: price-fixing
can only affect the payments if some of its participants are not amongst
the auction winners.
Theorem 3.9. Consider a bridgeless matroid with ground set A and
costs c(a) independent continuous random variables, and let F ⊆ A be
an independent set. Condition on the costs of all items not in F (which
by (3.13) determines cXvcg(F, a) for all a ∈ F ), and on the event F ⊆
S∗ (which by (3.14) determines cVCG(a) = cXvcg(F, a) for all a ∈ F ).
Then the conditional distributions of c(a), a ∈ F , are independent with
c(a) having the same distribution as the conditioned random variable(
c(a) | c(a) ≤ cVCG(a)), where we regard cVCG(a) = cXvcg(a) as a
constant.
The final statement means, more formally, that if the conditioning in
the theorem yields a value cVCG(a) = cXvcg(a) = x, then the conditional
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distribution of c(a) equals the distribution of
(
c(a) | c(a) ≤ x) (where
we do not condition on anything else).
Note that this theorem does not assume uniform distributions: the
item costs may follow any continuous distributions, which need not be
identical. We give some applications to non-uniform cost distributions
in Section 8.
4. A simple proof of Theorems 3.1 and 3.3
In this section we give a proof of Theorem 3.1 which also yields
Theorem 3.3. This argument was sketched in [AHW09]; since it has
not appeared in print, we give it in full here, with kind permission of
the authors.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Since the distribution of each c(a) is continuous,
almost surely c(a) 6= cVCG(a; I) and thus S∗ is unique and (2.11) holds.
The total VCG cost is thus by (2.13), a.s.,
cVCG =
∑
a∈S∗
cVCG(a; I) =
∑
a∈A
cVCG(a; I)1
[
c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I)] (4.1)
and the expected total VCG cost is
E
(
cVCG
)
=
∑
a∈A
E
(
cVCG(a; I)1
[
c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I)]). (4.2)
By the method of conditional expectations, the expected contribution
for item a is
E
(
cVCG(a; I)1
[
c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I)])
= EA\a
(
Ea
(
cVCG(a; I)1
[
c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I)] | A \ a)) (4.3)
where in the latter expression the inner (conditional) expectation Ea
means the expectation over the cost distribution for item a conditioned
upon the values of the costs for all items except a (with slight redun-
dancy, we also indicate this as a conditioning on A \ a), and the outer
expectation EA\a means the expectation over the distribution of the
costs for all other items. Taking advantage of the independence of
the item costs and recalling that cVCG(a; I) does not depend on c(a),
looking at the inner expectation above we have
Ea
(
cVCG(a; I)1
[
c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I)] | A \ a)
= cVCG(a; I) Pra
(
c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I) | A \ a). (4.4)
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Similarly, for the total nominal cost c∗ we have almost surely
c∗ =
∑
a∈A
c(a)1
[
c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I)] , (4.5)
Ec∗ =
∑
a∈A
E
(
c(a)1
[
c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I)]), (4.6)
where the expected contribution for item a is
EA\a
(
Ea
(
c(a)1
[
c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I)] | A \ a)). (4.7)
Taking advantage of the independence of the item costs, and that a
has uniform distribution U(0, da), in the inner expectation in (4.7) we
have
Ea
(
c(a)1
[
c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I)] | A \ a)
= Ea
(
c(a) | c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I)) Pra (c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I) | A \ a)
= 1
2
min
{
da, c
VCG(a; I)
}
Pra
(
c(a) ≤ cVCG(a; I) | A \ a). (4.8)
Immediately, each term given by (4.8) is at most half that of the
same term in (4.4), and thus the expectation (4.7) is at most half the
expectation (4.3); correspondingly the sum of the expectations in (4.6)
at most half that of (4.2). That is, the expected nominal cost is at
most half the expected VCG cost. 
First proof of Theorem 3.3. In this special case of Theorem 3.1, all
da = 1. Moreover, by the matroid basis exchange property, since a
is not a bridge, if S is any basis containing a, there exists b 6= a such
that S \ {a} ∪ {b} is a basis, and it follows from (2.4) that
cVCG(a; I) ≤ 1. (4.9)
Hence, the minimum in (4.8) is achieved by cVCG(a; I), each term in
(4.8) is exactly half that in (4.4), and thus the proof above of Theo-
rem 3.1 yields equality. 
Remark 4.1. The proof of Theorem 3.3 shows that equality holds
in Theorem 3.1 if and only if cVCG(a; I) ≤ da a.s., for every a ∈ A.
This is not generally true outside the matroid setting, even if all da are
equal; see Example 9.5 and [CFMS09]. As pointed out by [AHW09],
if we know a priori that all item costs are bounded by 1, we could
use a modified VCG auction where the VCG payment for each item
is capped to be at most 1; this is equivalent to introducing fictitious
“shadow copies” with costs 1 of all items. For this modified auction
mechanism, the argument above shows that equality holds in (3.1)
[AHW09].
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Remark 4.2. The MST result of [CFMS09] is the special case of The-
orem 3.3 given by Example 3.2. We will not rederive the results of
[CFMS09] for shortest paths and minimum-cost matchings, but they
may be thought of as following from the reasoning of Remark 4.1: in
these settings the VCG costs are not deterministically capped at 1,
but they are less than 1 asymptotically almost surely, leading to the
asymptotic equalities found in [CFMS09].
5. A matroidal proof of Theorem 3.3
In this section we give a second proof of Theorem 3.3 using properties
specific to matroids, and introducing arguments useful later. We begin
by proving Lemma 3.4.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. We regard item a as arriving at time c(a). Let
S ∈ S be a structure (here, a basis), and select the elements of S as they
arrive. At time t, we thus have selected the set S∩A(t) of items. Since
the structure S is a basis, |S| = r(A) and also S∩A(t) is an independent
subset of A(t), whence |S ∩A(t)| ≤ r(A(t)). Consequently,
c(S) =
∑
a∈S
c(a) =
∑
a∈S
∫ ∞
0
1[t < c(a)] dt =
∫ ∞
0
∑
a∈S
1[t < c(a)] dt
=
∫ ∞
0
(
|S| −
∑
a∈S
1[t ≥ c(a)]
)
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
(|S| − |S ∩A(t)|) dt ≥ ∫ ∞
0
(
r(A)− r(A(t))) dt. (5.1)
Now, suppose S to be the greedily chosen basis, that is, the one
produced by the following algorithm: take the items in order of arrival
(increasing cost), breaking ties arbitrarily, and add an item to S if it
is independent of all items previously seen (thus independent of the
items already in S). By construction, S is independent, and at each
time t ≥ 0, |S ∩ A(t)| = r(A(t)), since every new item that increases
the rank of A(t) is added to S. Letting t→∞ yields |S| = r(A), and
thus S is a basis, so S ∈ S. Furthermore, there is equality in (5.1)
for this basis S. This establishes (3.4) of Lemma 3.4. (It also shows
that S is a minimum structure S∗, reproving the well-known fact that
the greedy algorithm is optimal for matroids. Indeed this property
characterizes matroids, a fact known as the Rado-Edmonds theorem;
see [Rad57,Gal68,Edm71].)
For the VCG payment, note that the incentive payment c+(a) of an
item a by the definition (2.3) is c∗(M∞a ) − c∗(M), where M∞a is the
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matroidM with the cost c(a) changed to∞. This changes the set A(t)
to A(t) \ a, for every t <∞, and thus (3.4) yields
c+(a) = c∗(M∞a )− c∗(M)
=
∫ ∞
0
(
r(A)− r(A(t) \ a)
)
dt−
∫ ∞
0
(
r(A)− r(A(t))
)
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
(
r(A(t))− r(A(t) \ a)
)
dt. (5.2)
Summing over a we obtain by (2.12) the total VCG overpayment
cVCG − c∗ =
∑
a∈A
c+(a) =
∫ ∞
0
∑
a∈A
(
r(A(t))− r(A(t) \ a)) dt. (5.3)
By definition, r(A(t))− r(A(t) \ a) = 1 if a is a bridge in A(t), and 0
otherwise, and thus, recalling the definition (3.2),∑
a∈A
(
r(A(t))− r(A(t) \ a)) = β(A(t)), (5.4)
the number of bridges in A(t). Combining (5.3) and (5.4) yields (3.5).

Remark 5.1. If we change the cost of a to 0, the set A(t) is changed
to A(t) ∪ {a} for every t > 0. Applying (3.4) to I∞a and I0a yields,
similarly to (5.2), a formula for the VCG threshold for an item:
cVCG(a; I) =
∫ ∞
0
(
r(A(t) ∪ {a})− r(A(t) \ a)
)
dt. (5.5)
Remark 5.2. In the case of a graph matroid defined by a connected
graph G as in Example 3.2, for any F ⊆ A, r(F ) = n− κ(F ), where n
is the number of vertices in G and κ(F ) is the number of components
of the subgraph F of G with vertex set V (G) and edge set F . Since G
is connected, r(A) = n− 1. Hence (3.4) can be written
c∗(M) =
∫ ∞
0
(
κ(A(t))− 1)) dt. (5.6)
This formula has been used by [Jan95] and [CFI+12] to study the cost
of the MST in a complete graph Kn with random i.i.d. edge costs. See
further Example 9.1.
We turn to the case of random costs with the uniform distribution
U(0, 1).
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Lemma 5.3. Where each element a ∈ A has cost c(a) ∼ U(0, 1) inde-
pendently,
E(β(A(t))) = t
d
dt
E(r(A(t))), 0 < t < 1.
Proof. We argue informally. (See also Section 7 below, specifically the
second proof of (3.11)–(3.12).) Run the process A(t) backwards in time,
from t = 1 to t = 0. At time t, all elements in A(t) have distribution
U(0, 1) conditioned upon being less than t, which is to say distribution
U(0, t). It follows that in the (backward) time interval (t, t− dt), each
element of A(t) is lost with probability (1/t)dt. In particular, this holds
for each of the β(A(t)) bridges, whose deletion would reduce the rank.
Thus the expected decrease in r(A(t)) is β(A(t))t−1dt. Going forward
in time, this means
d
dt
E(r(A(t))) = t−1E(β(A(t))). 
Second proof of Theorem 3.3. SinceM is bridgeless, β(A(t)) = β(A) =
0 for t > 1, and thus by (3.5), Lemma 5.3, integration by parts and
(3.4),
EcVCG − Ec∗ =
∫ 1
0
Eβ(A(t)) dt =
∫ 1
0
t
d
dt
E(r(A(t))) dt
=
[
t
(
Er(A(t))
)]1
t=0
−
∫ 1
0
E(r(A(t))) dt
= r(A)−
∫ 1
0
E(r(A(t))) dt
=
∫ 1
0
(
r(A)− Er(A(t))) dt = Ec∗. (5.7)

6. Conditional expectations and distributions
In this section we prove Lemma 3.8 and Theorem 3.9, then present
two corollaries and prove Theorem 3.5.
Proof of Lemma 3.8. We first prove (3.14). We assume for simplicity
that all 2|A| sums of costs over different sets of elements are distinct.
Note that this can always be achieved by adding small independent
random increments ∆c(a) to the costs. (If S∗ is a minimum structure,
we may for example take ∆c(a) ∼ U(0, ε/|S∗|) for a ∈ S∗ and ∆c(a) ∼
U(ε, 2ε) for a /∈ S∗, for a small ε > 0, so that S∗ is still a minimum
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structure.) Since both sides of the equality in (3.14) are continuous
functions of the item costs, the general case follows by continuity.
Define B(F,E) to be a minimum-cost basis in I0,∞F\E,E, so that
c(B(F,E)) = c∗(I0,∞F\E,E) + c(F \ E). (6.1)
We will only use this definition where F is an independent set and
E ⊆ F , and we think of B(F,E) as a cheapest basis forced to avoid
E but to include the rest of F . For convenience we write B(F, {a}) as
B(F, a). Note that B(F,E) has finite cost if and only if there exists a
basis avoiding E, i.e. if r(A \ E) = r(A). By our assumption above,
B(F,E) is unique when it has finite cost; in particular, S∗ = B(∅, ∅) is
unique.
We claim that
F ⊆ S∗ =⇒ (∀a ∈ F )(∃b ∈ A) : B({a} , a) = B(F, a) = (S∗ \ a) ∪ {b} .
(6.2)
Informally, this says that if F is optimal, then any single-element ex-
clusion perturbs its best completion by just one further element. To see
this, let a ∈ F ⊆ S∗ and consider constructing B = B({a} , a) by the
greedy algorithm. (Since the matroid is bridgeless, A \ {a} includes a
basis, so B({a} , a) has finite cost.) This goes identically to the greedy
construction of S∗ until element a is reached: a is added to S∗ but not
to B. Then, every element accepted to S∗ is accepted to B, but even-
tually some b not chosen for S∗ is chosen for B; denote by S∗i and Bi
the two collections of elements at this point. Then S∗i ∪{b} = Bi ∪{a}
is dependent, and
r(Bi) = |Bi| = |S∗i | = r(S∗i ) = r(S∗i ∪ {b}) = r(Bi ∪ {a}). (6.3)
Thus r(S∗i ) = r(S
∗
i ∪ {b}) and r(Bi) = r(Bi ∪ {a}), and it follows by
the submodular property of the rank that for any subset H ⊆ A,
r(Bi ∪H) = r(Bi ∪ {a} ∪H) = r(S∗i ∪ {b} ∪H) = r(S∗i ∪H). (6.4)
Since the greedy algorithm selects the elements that increase the rank
of the set selected so far, it follows from (6.4) that from now on, ex-
actly the same elements will be selected for B = B({a} , a) and S∗.
Thus B({a} , a) = (S∗ \ a) ∪ {b}. The minimization for B({a} , a) is a
relaxation of that for B(F, a), yet we have shown that B({a} , a)∩F =
[(S∗ \ a) ∪ {b}] ∩ F = F \ a, therefore B({a} , a) = B(F, a), which
completes the proof of (6.2).
Next, recalling (6.1),
c∗(I0a) = c(B({a} , ∅))− c(a) and c∗(I∞a ) = c(B({a} , a)). (6.5)
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Furthermore, if a ∈ F ⊆ S∗, then B({a} , ∅) = B(F, ∅) = S∗, and
(6.2) shows that B({a} , a) = B(F, a). Thus by the VCG threshold
definition (2.4), (6.5), (6.1) again, and (3.13),
cVCG(a) = c∗(I∞a )− c∗(I0a) = c(B({a} , a))− [c(B({a} , ∅))− c(a)]
= c(B(F, a))− [c(B(F, ∅))− c(a)]
= c∗(I0,∞F\{a},a)− c∗(I0F )
= cXvcg(F, a).
This proves (3.14).
We next prove (3.17), under the hypothesis that all 2|A| sums of costs
over different sets of elements are distinct. (This hypothesis is natural
and convenient, but could be weakened.)
We first claim that
F ⊆ S∗ ⇐⇒ (∀a ∈ F ) : c(B(F, a)) ≥ c(B(F, ∅)). (6.6)
The forward implication is trivial: B(F, a) is a basis, S∗ is a minimum-
cost basis, and B(F, ∅) is a basis minimized over a set of possibilities
including S∗. The backward implication, through the contrapositive,
says informally that if F is not contained within the minimum-cost ba-
sis then excluding some single element a improves it, with c(B(F, a)) <
c(B(F, ∅)). To prove this, note that by assumption, all element costs
are distinct. Sort both B = B(F, ∅) and S∗ in order of increasing
cost with elements b1, b2, . . . and s1, s2, . . . and write Bi := {b1, . . . , bi}
and S∗i := {s1, . . . , si}. Let i be the first index for which si 6= bi.
Since S∗ can be constructed by the greedy algorithm it must be that
c(si) ≤ c(bi), and since all element costs are distinct, c(si) < c(bi).
Adding si to B creates a circuit C1, at least one of whose elements bj
must have index j ≥ i (or else C1 ⊆ Bi−1 ∪ {si} = S∗i−1 ∪ {si} = S∗i ,
contradicting independence of S∗). Thus c(si) < c(bi) ≤ c(bj), and
B′ = B ∪ {si} \ bj has lower cost than B. B′ is also a basis. (If not, it
has a circuit C2 ∋ si, thus B∪{si} has circuits C1 containing si and bj ,
and C2 containing si but not bj , and by the circuit exchange axiom has
a circuit C3 with C3 ⊆ C1∪C2 \ si ⊆ B, contradicting independence of
B.) It cannot be that bj ∈ B \F , for then B′ ⊇ F which would contra-
dict minimality of B = B(F, ∅). Thus bj ∈ F and we have shown that
c(B(F, bj)) ≤ c(B′) < c(B(F, ∅)), which completes the proof of (6.6).
By (6.1) and definition (3.13), observation (6.6) is equivalent to
(3.17).
We have proved (3.17) under the hypothesis that all sums of costs
over different sets of elements are distinct. This immediately implies
(3.15) and (3.16) under the same hypothesis. Moreover, the continuity
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argument at the beginning of the proof applies to (3.15) and (3.16),
which shows that they hold for arbitrary costs, concluding the proof
of Lemma 3.8. (Note that the continuity argument does not apply to
(3.17).) 
Proof of Theorem 3.9. Fix F and condition on the costs c|A\F . (I.e.,
sample these costs first.) As noted after (3.13), for a ∈ F this deter-
mines cXvcg(a) = c∗(I0,∞F\a,a)− c∗(I0F ).
By hypothesis, the costs c(a) are random with independent con-
tinuous distributions, and thus almost surely c(a) 6= cXvcg(a) for ev-
ery a ∈ F . This remains true when we condition also on F ⊆ S∗
since this is an event of positive probability. By (3.15)–(3.16), and
c(a) 6= cXvcg(a) a.s. as just observed, this is the same as further condi-
tioning on c(a) ≤ cXvcg(F, a) for all a ∈ F , and thus the conditioned
distributions of c(a), a ∈ F , are independent and given by separately
conditioning each c(a) on c(a) ≤ cXvcg(F, a). 
Remark 6.1. Since the resulting conditional distribution in Theo-
rem 3.9 depends only on the event F ⊆ S∗ and the VCG costs cVCG(a),
we obtain (by the definition of conditional expectation) the same result
by conditioning on these only.
In the special case of i.i.d. uniform costs, Theorem 3.9 can be stated
as follows.
Corollary 6.2. Consider a bridgeless matroid with ground set A and
i.i.d. costs c(a) ∼ U(0, 1), and let F ⊆ A be an independent set. Then,
conditioning on the event F ⊆ S∗ and on the costs c(a), a /∈ F , the
VCG costs cVCG(a), a ∈ F , are determined by (3.14) and the con-
ditional distributions of c(a), a ∈ F , are independent with c(a) ∼
U(0, cVCG(a)).
The same holds if we instead condition on F ⊆ S∗ and the values
cVCG(a), a ∈ F .
Proof. Theorem 3.9 shows that the conditional distribution of c(a) is
uniform with c(a) ∼ U(0,min(cVCG(a), 1)). Furthermore, by (4.9), or
as a consequence of (6.2), we have cVCG(a) ≤ 1. Hence, the conditional
distribution is U(0, cVCG(a)). 
In the case when F = {a} is a singleton, Corollary 6.2 says that for
any item a, conditioned on a ∈ S∗ and cVCG(a), the distribution of
c(a) is uniform on (0, cVCG(a)). This was seen already in the proof of
Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 in Section 4; Corollary 6.2 is thus a considerable
generalization of this fact to several costs.
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The other extreme case is the case when F is a basis. In this case,
F ⊆ S∗ is equivalent to F = S∗, and Corollary 6.2 reduces to the
following.
Corollary 6.3. Consider a bridgeless matroid with costs c(a) i.i.d.
uniform random variables, c(a) ∼ U(0, 1). Conditioned on a minimum
structure S∗ and VCG payments cVCG(a), a ∈ S∗, for its elements,
the costs c(a), a ∈ S∗, of the elements in the minimum structure are
independent with c(a) ∼ U(0, cVCG(a)). 
Proof of Theorem 3.5. It follows immediately from Corollary 6.3 that
conditioned on the minimum structure S∗ and on the VCG payments
cVCG(a) for all a ∈ S∗, the conditional expectation of c∗ =∑a∈S∗ c(a)
equals 1
2
∑
a∈S∗ c
VCG(a) = 1
2
cVCG. Hence the same holds also if we
condition only on cVCG. 
Remark 6.4. In Corollary 6.3, conditioning on the individual VCG
values cVCG(a), we obtain the conditional distribution of the costs c(a),
a ∈ S∗, and thus that of their sum c∗. In Theorem 3.5, conditioning
on the total VCG cost cVCG but not on the individual values cVCG(a),
we obtain only a formula for the conditional expectation of c∗; there is
no general formula for the conditional distribution of c∗ given cVCG, as
is seen in Example 9.3.
7. Variances and covariances
In this section, we continue to consider a bridgeless matroid with
costs c(a) i.i.d. uniform random variables, c(a) ∼ U(0, 1), and will
prove Theorem 3.7.
First, we use Corollary 6.3 to obtain a formula for Var(c∗).
Theorem 7.1. For a bridgeless matroid with costs c(a) i.i.d. uniform
random variables, c(a) ∼ U(0, 1),
Var
(
c∗
)
=
1
4
Var
(
cVCG
)
+
1
4
E
(∑
a∈S∗
c(a)2
)
(7.1)
and
E
(
(c∗)2
)
=
1
4
E
(
(cVCG)2
)
+
1
4
E
(∑
a∈S∗
c(a)2
)
. (7.2)
Proof. Let G denote the σ-field generated by S∗ and the VCG costs
cVCG(a), a ∈ S∗. (More formally, G is generated by the random
variables
{
1[a ∈ S∗] , 1[a ∈ S∗] cVCG(a) : a ∈ A}. Recall that S∗ is a.s.
unique.) By Corollary 6.3, conditioned on G, the random variables c(a)
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for a ∈ S∗ are independent with c(a) ∼ U(0, cVCG(a)). Hence, by the
law of total variance, recalling c∗ =
∑
a∈S∗ c(a),
Var
(
c∗
)
= Var
(
E(c∗ | G))+ E(Var(c∗ | G))
= Var
(∑
a∈S∗
E(c(a) | G)
)
+ E
(∑
a∈S∗
Var
(
c(a) | G)))
= Var
(∑
a∈S∗
1
2
cVCG(a)
)
+ E
(∑
a∈S∗
1
12
(cVCG(a))2
)
= Var
(1
2
cVCG
)
+
1
12
E
(∑
a∈S∗
(cVCG(a))2
)
. (7.3)
The same conditioning gives
E
(∑
a∈S∗
c(a)2
)
= E
(
E
(∑
a∈S∗
c(a)2 | G
))
=
1
3
E
(∑
a∈S∗
(cVCG(a))2
)
, (7.4)
and (7.1) follows from (7.3) and (7.4).
Finally, (7.2) follows from (7.1) using Theorem 3.3. 
Remark 7.2. An alternative (but related) proof is obtained by writ-
ing c∗ =
∑
a∈A 1[a ∈ S∗] c(a) and computing mixed second moments
E
(
1[a, b ∈ F ] c(a)c(b)) of the terms in this sum by conditioning and
using Corollary 6.2 with F = {a, b}. This method can also be used to
obtain similar (but more complicated) formulas for E(c∗)3 and higher
moments.
We use also some of the ideas in the second proof of Theorem 3.3
(Section 5), to establish the following formula related to Lemma 3.4.
Lemma 7.3. For a bridgeless matroid with costs c(a) i.i.d. uniform
random variables,
E
(∑
a∈S∗
c(a)2
)
=
∫ 1
0
(
r(A)− Er(A(t))) 2t dt = ∫ 1
0
E(β(A(t))) t dt.
Proof. S∗ is a.s. unique, and is then given by the greedy algorithm. In
this case we have, arguing as for (5.1),∑
a∈S∗
c(a)2 =
∑
a∈S∗
∫ ∞
0
1[t < c(a)] 2t dt =
∫ ∞
0
(|S∗| − |S∗ ∩ A(t)|) 2t dt
=
∫ ∞
0
(
r(A)− r(A(t)) 2t dt. (7.5)
(Note that (7.5) holds for a matroid with arbitrary costs c(a), even if
there is not a unique minimum structure, as long as S∗ is chosen by
the greedy algorithm.)
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The first equality in the lemma follows by taking the expectation,
and the second follows by an integration by parts, like that in (5.7). 
Proof of Theorem 3.7. The theorem consists of equations (3.8)–(3.12).
We begin by noting the special case m = 1 of Corollary 3.6:
E
(
c∗cVCG
)
= 1
2
E
(
(cVCG)2
)
. (7.6)
Equation (3.8) follows from (7.6) and Theorem 3.3.
By (3.8), Cov(2c∗ − cVCG, cVCG) = 0, and thus
Var(2c∗) = Var(cVCG) + Var(2c∗ − cVCG), (7.7)
which yields (3.9).
Next, (3.10) follows directly from Lemma 3.4’s equation (3.4). (The
arithmetic is simplified using that Var(X) = Cov(X,X) and that
Cov(X, Y ) is a bilinear form.) This does not use our assumptions on
the distribution of the costs, so (3.10) holds for any cost distribution,
except that in general one has to integrate to ∞.
Finally, (7.7) and Theorem 7.1’s equation (7.1) yield
Var
(
cVCG − 2c∗) = 4Var(c∗)−Var(cVCG) = E(∑
a∈S∗
c(a)2
)
, (7.8)
and thus (3.11)–(3.12) follow by Lemma 7.3. 
We also want to point out an alternative proof of (3.11)–(3.12) using
martingale theory and the ideas in Section 5.
Second proof of (3.11)–(3.12). The argument in the proof of Lemma 5.3
really shows that
M(x) := r(A(1− x))− r(A) +
∫ 1
1−x
β(A(t))
dt
t
, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, (7.9)
is a (continuous-time) martingale on [0, 1]. (With respect to the σ-
fields Fx generated by {c(a) ∨ (1− x)}, i.e., by the item arrivals after
time 1−x. We may modifyM to be right-continuous to conform with
standard theory; this makes no difference below and will be ignored.)
Note that M(0) = 0, and thus EM(x) = 0, which by (7.9) leads to a
(perhaps more formal) version of the proof of Lemma 5.3.
By (7.9), the martingaleM(x) has finite variation, with jumps ∆M(x) =
∆r(A(1 − x)) that are (a.s.) all −1. Hence the quadratic variation
[M,M]x of the martingale is given by
[M,M]x =
∑
0≤y≤x
(∆M(y))2 =
∑
0≤y≤x
(−∆r(A(1− y)))
= r(A)− r(A(1− x)), (7.10)
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and thus
Var(M(x)) = E[M,M]x = r(A)− Er(A(1− x)). (7.11)
(See e.g. [Pro05, Section II.6, in particular Corollary 3] or [Kal02, The-
orem 26.6].) Furthermore, since M is a martingale, if 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1
then
Cov(M(x),M(y)) = Cov(M(x),M(x)) = r(A)− Er(A(1− x)).
(7.12)
Thus, integrating over x, y ∈ [0, 1],
Var
(∫ 1
0
M(x) dx
)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Cov
(M(x),M(y)) dx dy
= 2
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
(
r(A)− Er(A(1− x))) dy dx
= 2
∫ 1
0
(1− x)(r(A)− Er(A(1− x))) dx. (7.13)
By (7.9),∫ 1
0
M(x) dx =
∫ 1
0
(
r(A(1− x))− r(A)) dx+ ∫ 1
0
∫ 1
1−x
β(A(t))
dt
t
dx
=
∫ 1
0
(
r(A(t))− r(A)) dt+ ∫ 1
0
β(A(t))
∫ 1
1−t
dx
dt
t
=
∫ 1
0
(
r(A(t))− r(A)) dt+ ∫ 1
0
β(A(t)) dt
= −c∗ + (cVCG − c∗)
by (3.4)–(3.5). Hence Var
(
cVCG− 2c∗) = Var(∫ 1
0
M(x) dx), and (3.11)
follows from (7.13). As said earlier, (3.12) follows from (3.11) by inte-
gration by parts. 
8. Non-uniform cost distributions
We have so far, with a few exceptions (notably Theorem 3.9), as-
sumed that the item costs are independent and uniformly distributed
U(0, 1). However, we can also derive some related results for random
costs with other distributions (not even necessarily identical), still as-
suming that the costs of different items are independent.
For the next theorem, we say that a positive random variable has a
(weakly) decreasing density function if it is absolutely continuous with
a density function f(x) on (0,∞) satisfying f(x) ≥ f(y) when 0 <
x < y < ∞, and a strictly decreasing density function if furthermore
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there exists B ≤ ∞ such that f(x) > f(y) when 0 < x < y < B and
f(x) = 0 for x > B.
Theorem 3.1 extends to this setting.
Theorem 8.1. In the general VCG setting, if the costs c(a) are inde-
pendent random variables with decreasing density functions, then
E(c∗) ≤ 1
2
E(cVCG). (8.1)
If furthermore every c(a) has a strictly decreasing density function,
then the inequality (8.1) is strict, provided E(c∗) <∞.
Proof. As long as the costs are independent, the proof of Theorem 3.1
in Section 4 up to (4.7) applies to any continuous distributions. If we
condition on the costs of all items except a, which determines cVCG(a),
and then condition further on the event c(a) ≤ cVCG(a), then the con-
ditional distribution of c(a) has a decreasing density function with sup-
port in [0, cVCG(a)], and thus the conditional expectation of c(a) is at
most 1
2
cVCG(a), with strict inequality if the density function is strictly
decreasing. It follows that the expectation (4.7) is at most half the
expectation (4.3), and the result follows by summing over a as in the
proof of Theorem 3.1. 
Likewise, in the matroid case, the corresponding result for condi-
tional expectations Theorem 3.5 generalizes as the theorem below, now
with an inequality where Theorem 3.5 had equality.
Theorem 8.2. For a bridgeless matroid with costs c(a) that are inde-
pendent random variables with decreasing density functions,
E
(
c∗ | cVCG) ≤ 1
2
cVCG. (8.2)
If furthermore every c(a) has a strictly decreasing density function,
then the inequality (8.2) is strict.
Proof. Let F be a basis in the matroid and condition on S∗ = F ,
and on the VCG costs cVCG(a), a ∈ F . (Recall from Theorem 3.9
that the VCG costs depend only on the item costs outside of F .) By
Theorem 3.9 and our hypothesis, the conditional distribution of each
c(a) has a decreasing density function with support in [0, cVCG(a)],
and thus the conditional expectation of c(a) is at most 1
2
cVCG(a), with
strict inequality if the density function is strictly decreasing. The result
follows by summing over a and relaxing the conditioning as in the proof
of Theorem 3.5. 
Note that while the unconditional inequality (8.1) holds in the gen-
eral VCG setting, the conditional inequality (8.2) does not always hold
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in the non-matroid case, even for U(0, 1) costs; this will be shown in
Example 9.5.
One case where these theorems apply (with strict inequalities) is
when the costs have independent exponential distributions. The expo-
nential distribution is discussed further in Example 9.4.
Corollary 8.3. In the general VCG setting, if the costs c(a) are inde-
pendent random variables with exponential distributions (possibly with
different means), then (8.1) holds with strict inequality.
Moreover, for a bridgeless matroid with such costs, (8.2) holds with
strict inequality. 
Remark 8.4 ([AHW09]). In the general VCG setting, suppose that
each item a exists in infinitely many copies a1, a2, . . . , with costs c(a1) <
c(a2) < . . . given by the points of a Poisson process on (0,∞) with
constant intensity λ(a). Only the cheapest copy a1 may be selected,
and its cost has an exponential distribution, so the nominal cost is the
same as with exponentially distributed costs. However, the existence
of further copies may reduce the VCG cost, since cVCG(a1) ≤ c(a2).
If we condition on the costs of all copies of all items, except for a1,
then c(a1) ∼ U(0, c(a2)) and since cVCG(a1) ≤ c(a2), we obtain Ec∗ =
1
2
EcVCG as in the first proof of Theorem 3.3; see also Remark 4.1.
As noted in the introduction (and in [AHW09]), simple expressions
result when the item costs are i.i.d. with Beta distribution B(α, 1),
i.e., with density function αxα−1 on (0, 1), for some α > 0. (Note that
α = 1 is the uniform case U(0, 1), and that the densities are decreasing
for α ≤ 1 but not for α > 1.)
Theorem 8.5. In the general VCG setting, if the costs c(a) are inde-
pendent B(α, 1) random variables, with α > 0, then
E(c∗) ≤ α
α + 1
E(cVCG). (8.3)
For a bridgeless matroid with these item costs, equality holds and, more-
over,
E
(
c∗ | cVCG) = α
α + 1
cVCG. (8.4)
Proof. We argue again as in the proofs of Theorems 8.1 and 8.2. In
the present case, the conditional distribution of c(a) given c(a) ≤ v has
support on [0,min(v, 1)], where it has density proportional to xα. It
follows that
E
(
c(a) | c(a) ≤ v) = α
α + 1
min(v, 1) (8.5)
for every v > 0, and the result follows as in the proofs above. 
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If Theorem 3.1 casts doubt on the practicality of a VCG auction, with
its factor-of-two expected overpayment, Theorem 8.5 may be taken
more hopefully: for Beta-distributed costs, with large α, the expected
overpayment is small.
9. Examples
Example 9.1 (Minimum spanning tree). Our motivating example (see
also Example 3.2) was the minimum-cost spanning tree in the complete
graph Kn with i.i.d. U(0, 1) edge costs. This object has received ex-
tensive study. It was shown by Frieze [Fri85] that its expected cost (in
our language, the expected nominal cost) satisfies
Ec∗ → ζ(3) as n→∞; (9.1)
see [CFI+12] for a recent sharper result.
Furthermore, it was shown in [Jan95] that n1/2(c∗−Ec∗) d−→ N(0, σ2),
as n→∞, where, by Wa¨stlund [Wa¨s05] (see also [JW06]), σ2 = 6ζ(4)−
4ζ(3). It can be verified by using estimates in the proof in [Jan95] that
the variance converges too, i.e.,
Var(c∗) ∼ σ
2
n
=
6ζ(4)− 4ζ(3)
n
=
1.68571 . . .
n
. (9.2)
Our theorems now yield the expectation and variance of the VCG
cost. (The expectation (9.3) was found more directly by [CFMS09].)
Theorem 9.2. For the minimum spanning tree in a complete graph
with i.i.d. U(0, 1) edge weigths,
EcVCG = 2Ec∗ → 2ζ(3), (9.3)
Var
(
cVCG
) ∼ 24ζ(4)− 18ζ(3)
n
=
4.33873 . . .
n
. (9.4)
Proof. The expectation (9.3) follows directly from Theorem 3.3 and
(9.1). For the variance, by (3.11) and Remark 5.2,
Var
(
cVCG − 2c∗) = ∫ 1
0
(
r(A)− Er(A(t))) 2t dt (9.5)
=
∫ 1
0
2t
(
Eκ(A(t))− 1)) dt. (9.6)
The latter integral can be estimated using minor modifications of es-
timates in [CFI+12] (the main terms come from counting tree compo-
nents; we omit the details), which yields
Var
(
cVCG − 2c∗) = ∫ 1
0
2t
(
Eκ(A(t))− 1)) dt ∼ 2ζ(3)
n
. (9.7)
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Finally, (9.4) follows from (9.2) and (9.7) by (3.9). 
Example 9.3 (Uniform matroid). As a very simple example, consider
the uniform matroid Un,k: it has n elements (items) and every subset
with exactly k elements is a basis. Our objective is thus simply to buy
any k items, and obviously the minimum structure consists of the k
cheapest items. This simple example can easily be analyzed directly,
without the general theory above. We assume 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 so that
Un,k is bridgeless.
If we order the items as a(1), . . . , a(n) in order of increasing cost (for
simplicity assuming that there are no ties), the minimum structure is
S∗ =
{
a(1), . . . , a(k)
}
. Thus
c∗ =
k∑
i=1
c(a(i)). (9.8)
If a ∈ S∗, then in the instance I∞a , we select a(k+1) instead of a; thus
the incentive payment (2.3) is c(a(k+1)) − c(a) and the VCG payment
for a is, by (2.5), c(a(k+1)). Hence
cVCG = kc(a(k+1)). (9.9)
(In fact, it is easily seen that cVCG(a; I) = c(a(k+1)) if a ∈ S∗ and
cVCG(a; I) = c(a(k)) if a /∈ S∗.)
If the costs c(ai) = Ui are i.i.d. U(0, 1), we thus have
c∗ =
k∑
i=1
U(i), (9.10)
cVCG = kU(k+1), (9.11)
where U(i), the ith order statistic of {Uj}n1 , is well known to have Beta
distribution B(i, n + 1− i) and mean EU(i) = i/(n+ 1). Thus
Ec∗ =
k∑
i=1
i
n+ 1
=
k(k + 1)
2(n+ 1)
, (9.12)
EcVCG =
k(k + 1)
n+ 1
, (9.13)
in accordance with Theorem 3.3.
In this simple case, we can study the conditional distribution of c∗
given cVCG in detail. It is well known that, conditioned on U(k+1), the
distribution of (U(i))
k
i=1 equals the distribution of the order statistics
of k independent uniform random variables on the interval (0, U(k+1)).
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Hence, (
(U(i))
k
i=1 | U(k+1)
) d
= (V(i)U(k+1))
k
i=1,
where (Vi)
k
1 also are i.i.d. U(0, 1) random variables, independent of
(Uj)
n
1 . Consequently, (9.10)–(9.11) yield(
c∗ | cVCG) d= SkU(k+1) = Sk
k
cVCG, (9.14)
where Sk :=
∑k
1 Vi is independent of c
VCG. Since E(Sk/k) =
1
2
, this
is in accordance with Theorem 3.5. It also shows that the conditional
distribution of c∗ given cVCG may vary (although its expectation is
always 1
2
cVCG). For example, if k = 1 then c∗ is uniform on (0, cVCG),
while if k is large, c∗ is concentrated close to 1
2
cVCG. In particular,
E(c∗)2 is not determined by E(cVCG)2, and there is no analogue of
Theorem 3.3 for the second moment. Likewise there is no analogue of
Corollary 3.6 for higher moments of c∗ without c∗ appearing on the
right-hand side; this is clear for m = 0, and counterexamples can be
generated for larger values of m.
The variances are also easily computed, using that for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n,
E(U(i) | U(j)) = ijU(j). We find that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n,
E(U(i)U(j)) =
i(j + 1)
(n + 1)(n+ 2)
(9.15)
Cov(U(i), U(j)) =
i(n + 1− j)
(n + 1)2(n+ 2)
, (9.16)
and straightforward calculations from (9.10), (9.11) yield
Var(c∗) =
k(k + 1)(4nk + 2n+ k + 2− 3k2)
12(n+ 1)2(n + 2)
, (9.17)
Var(cVCG) =
k2(k + 1)(n− k)
(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)
. (9.18)
From (3.8) this allows us to obtain Cov(c∗, cVCG); we can also cal-
culate it too directly and verify equality. By (3.9), Var(cVCG − 2c∗) =
k(k + 1)(k + 2)/3(n + 1)(n + 2), and this can be checked against its
calculation by (3.11)–(3.12).
In particular, if n→∞ and 1≪ k ≪ n, then Var(c∗)/Var(cVCG)→
1/3, and more precisely the covariance matrix of (c∗, cVCG) is asymp-
totic to
k3
n2
(
1/3 1/2
1/2 1
)
. (9.19)
If n → ∞ with k ≥ 1 fixed, we have instead Var(c∗)/Var(cVCG) →
(2k + 1)/(6k).
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The latter limit demonstrates that Var(c∗) and Var(cVCG) are not in
fixed proportion, so there is not a direct analogue of Theorem 3.3 for
variance.
Example 9.4 (Uniform matroid, exponential distribution). We con-
tinue to consider the uniform matroid Un,k as in Example 9.3, but
now consider costs c(a) that are i.i.d. and exponential Exp(1). Let
X(i) = c(a(i)), the ith smallest cost. It is well-known that the incre-
ments X(i)−X(i−1) (where X(0) = 0) are independent random variables
with X(i) −X(i−1) ∼ Exp(1/(n− i− 1)). Consequently,
EX(i) =
i∑
j=1
1
n− j + 1 (9.20)
and thus by (9.8)–(9.9),
Ec∗ =
k∑
j=1
k − j + 1
n− j + 1 =
k∑
j=1
j
n− k + j , (9.21)
EcVCG = k
k+1∑
j=1
1
n− j + 1 . (9.22)
Not only are these not a factor of 2 apart, as we already knew from
Corollary 8.3, but there doesn’t seem to be any simple general relation.
If for simplicity we consider the case k = 1, where our aim just
is to select the cheapest item, it follows from Theorem 3.9 that the
conditional distribution of c∗ given cVCG = v has density e−x/(1− e−v)
on (0, v). A simple calculation yields
E
(
c∗ | cVCG = v) = 1− e−v − ve−v
1− e−v =
ev − 1− v
ev − 1 . (9.23)
This is always < v/2, as shown by Corollary 8.3, with asymptotic
equality as v → 0.
Example 9.5 (Paths). [CFMS09] considered the minimum-cost path
between two given vertices in Kn with i.i.d. Exp(1) costs of the edges.
They showed that EcVCG ∼ 2Ec∗ as n→∞. It is not hard to show that
the same holds with i.i.d. U(0, 1) costs. In these cases, however, there
is not equality in (3.1). (This is not a matroid case, so Theorem 3.3
does not apply.)
For a simple explicit example, consider n = 3. Denoting the three
edges in K3 by a1, a2, a3 and their costs by X1, X2, X3, and let the two
given vertices be those joined by {a1} and {a2, a3}, so that
c∗ = min {X1, X2 +X3} . (9.24)
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It follows from this and (2.4) that cVCG(a1) = X2 + X3, c
VCG(a2) =
(X1 −X3)+ and cVCG(a3) = (X1 −X2)+, and thus
cVCG =
{
X2 +X3, if X1 ≤ X2 +X3,
2X1 −X2 −X3, if X1 ≥ X2 +X3.
(9.25)
Thus,
cVCG = max(X2 +X3, 2X1 −X2 −X3). (9.26)
Simple calculations, which we omit, show that in the U(0, 1) case,
Ec∗ = 11/24 while EcVCG = 13/12 (a check on these is that from
(9.26), 2c∗+ cVCG = 2X1 +X2 +X3, thus 2Ec
∗ +EcVCG = 2), showing
strict inequality in (3.1). Similarly, in the Exp(1) case, Ec∗ = 3/4 while
EcVCG = 5/2, with strict inequality in (8.1) as shown in Corollary 8.3.
Moreover, still for n = 3 and with U(0, 1) costs, the joint density of
c∗ and cVCG in [0, 1]× [0, 2] can easily be calculated from (9.24)–(9.26)
to be
f(x, y) = y1[x ≤ y ≤ 1]+ (2− y)1[1 < y ≤ 2]+ x
2
1[x ≤ min(y, 2− y)] .
(9.27)
For example, f(x, 1) = 1 + x/2, x ∈ [0, 1], and thus the conditional
distribution of (c∗ | cVCG = 1) has density (4 + 2x)/5 and conditional
expectation E(c∗ | cVCG = 1) = 8/15 > 1/2, showing that the inequal-
ity (8.2) does not necessarily hold in the non-matroid setting. More
generally, it follows from (9.27) that the density of cVCG is
f2(y) =
{
5
4
y2 if 0 ≤ y ≤ 1,
(2− y) + 1
4
(2− y)2 if 1 ≤ y ≤ 2, (9.28)
and the conditional expectation E(c∗ | cVCG) is
E(c∗ | cVCG = y) =


2y3/3
f2(y)
= 8
15
y if 0 ≤ y ≤ 1,
1
2
(2−y)+
1
6
(2−y)3
f2(y)
= 6+2(2−y)
2
12+3(2−y)
if 1 ≤ y ≤ 2.
In this example, E(c∗ | cVCG) is a decreasing function of cVCG in the
interval cVCG ∈ [1, 6 − √19], which shows that the behaviour of the
conditional expectation can be quite complicated and unexpected in
the general non-matroid case.
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